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Many scholars suggest that visa restrictions push individuals who
would have otherwise migrated legally towards illegal channels. This
expectation is difficult to test empirically for three reasons. First,
unauthorized migration is clandestine and often unobservable. Sec-
ond, interpersonal ties between migrants and would-be migrants
form a self-perpetuating system, which adapts in ways that are dif-
ficult to observe or predict. Third, empirical evaluations of immi-
gration policy are vulnerable to endogeneity and other issues of
causal inference. In this paper, we pair tailor-made empirical de-
signs with an agent-based computational model (ABM) to capture
the dynamics of a migration system that often elude empirical anal-
ysis, while grounding agent rules and characteristics with novel pri-
mary data collected in Jamaica, an origin country. We find that some
government-imposed restrictions on migrants can deter total migra-
tion, but others are ineffective. Relative to a system of free move-
ment, the minimal eligibility conditions required to classify migrants
into visa categories alone make migration inaccessible for many.
Restrictive policies imposed on student and high-skilled visa cate-
gories have little added effect because eligible individuals are likely
able to migrate through alternative legal categories. Meanwhile, re-
strictions on family-based visas result in significant reductions in
total migration. However, they also produce the largest reorientation
towards unauthorized channels – an unintended consequence that
even the highest rates of apprehension do not effectively eliminate.
Immigration Policy | Migration | Unauthorized Migration | Computa-
tional Modeling
Political leaders in many Western countries have called forincreased visa restrictions to control immigration. In the
aftermath of the November 2015 attacks in Paris, Marine Le
Pen declared, “It is essential that France recover the control of
its national borders, once and for all” (1). Similarly, one of the
main tenets of the Brexit campaign was to “take back control
of [UK] borders” (2). In the United States, Donald Trump
was propelled to victory with a campaign focused on border
control and ‘extreme vetting’ of Muslim migrants. During his
early days in office, he moved to change the composition of
incoming migrants and reduce flows from family-based and
high-skilled channels (3).
But will more restrictive immigration policies stop indi-
viduals from migrating? Many scholars suggest that visa
restrictions have counter-productive effects, leading individ-
uals to reorient to unauthorized channels (4, 5). While this
expectation is prominent in theoretical literature, scholars
have struggled to demonstrate it empirically. There are three
fundamental empirical challenges. First, unauthorized migra-
tion is often unobservable, due to its clandestine and sensitive
nature. Even the best estimates of unauthorized migration are
extremely limited, vulnerable to bias, and are often only re-
ported in the aggregate. Second, migration flows do not result
from the sum of individual decisions to migrate – they are part
of a dynamic and social process. The rich literature on mi-
grant networks holds that interpersonal ties between migrants
and would-be migrants form an adaptive self-perpetuating
system. As individual preferences are modulated by the non-
linear effects introduced by social interactions, networks make
migration difficult to measure and predict (4, 6, 7). As of
yet, existing research has, generally, been unable to connect
decisions and social processes occurring at the micro and meso
levels to macro-level trends in migration (8) (however, see (9)).
Third, drawing causal inferences in empirical evaluations of
immigration policy is problematic: policies are not exogenous
and we, generally, cannot observe counterfactual scenarios.
Taken together, empirical challenges such as these have led
the International Organization for Migration to conclude that,
“disregarding the uncertainty and complexity of migration leads
to an illusion of control on the part of the decision makers...
[and] this is why attempts at managing migration often lead
to unintended consequences” (10).
We present a data-driven agent-based computational model
(ABM) to examine migration for an origin-destination corri-
dor,∗ which is tailor-made to address these unique empirical
∗To be clear, our paper does not model all migration into a particular destination. This would require
a cross-national data collection strategy. We focus on a single origin country.
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challenges. The use of an ABM allows us to simulate migrant
reorientation using a generative approach, observing the indi-
vidual decision-making of agents, and more importantly, the
macro-level patterns that emerge through their interaction. In
building a system, we discretize the migrant’s decision into
smaller, interdependent components that can be measured
empirically and modeled individually. We calibrate the model
with an original nationally representative survey conducted in
Jamaica, designed to target each of these components using
a diverse set of individual indicators and population-based
experiments. Through this approach, we capture dynamics of
migration systems that often elude empirical analysis, while
grounding agent rules and characteristics with unbiased data
from an origin country. After demonstrating that the model is
capable of reproducing key empirical regularities, we conduct
in-silico policy experiments, in which we restrict common visa
routes, to estimate the counterfactual impact of immigration
policies on the volume and composition of simulated (il)legal
migrant flows.
Our results suggest that barriers to legal migration can
reduce overall migration, but they can also be ineffective or
even counterproductive. By far, the largest effects on legal
and unauthorized migration result from the imposition of mi-
grant channels. Restrictions to student and high-skilled visas
do little to change the volume or composition of incoming
migrants. Meanwhile, restricting access to family-based and
low-skilled work channels does appear to reduce overall migra-
tion. In doing so, however, these changes divert a significant
proportion of migrants to back-channels. This is particularly
true of family-based visa restrictions, which reorient roughly
twice as many individuals to unauthorized channels as low-
skilled work restrictions. Furthermore, increased enforcement
of unauthorized migration will not solve the problem of mi-
grant reorientation. Even very high rates of apprehension
coexist with high levels of unauthorized migration. In fact, the
effect of increasing enforcement is non-linear, such that the
effect of increasing levels of enforcement on illegal migration
is most pronounced when enforcement is already high.
Our paper makes a number of key contributions. While
ABMs are becoming increasingly prominent in the study of
migration (7, 11), to our knowledge, this is the first attempt
to use this method to estimate the ‘substitution effect’ (5)
whereby migrants, who would have entered legally, reorient to
unauthorized channels due to changes in policy. For policy-
makers and migrant advocates, we provide suggestions that
would reduce unauthorized migration, an outcome which would
have important implications for domestic politics and human
security. Evidence from the US finds that legal status is one of
the key drivers of anti-immigrant attitudes (12). For migrants
themselves, unauthorized status can make for precarious living
conditions, sub-market wages and limited access to services
and protections from the state. Therefore, it is critical to
assess the degree to which visa restrictions can undermine –
rather than facilitate – a government’s capacity for control.
The Model
Agent-based models of migration have gained momentum in
recent years (e.g. (11, 13, 14)), and our model contributes to
this nascent field (see (7) for a review). Our model follows
guidelines for best practice, which suggest taking seriously the
gap between desire and actual behavior, social influence, and
the role of uncertainty. They also emphasize the importance
of using a decision theory paired with empirical evidence to
determine agent rules (7). Decision making in our model is
based on random utility theory: individuals form preferences
for migration strategies based on their perceived ability to
successfully migrate using that strategy and engage in a nested
decision making process with choice uncertainty. Informed by
the psychological literature on heuristics, our agents do not
do not base their decisions on full information about policy,
but are boundedly rational. Their decision making is based
on their own experiential learning and information received
through social networks (15, 16).
In the interest of maintaining a clear model purpose and
parsimonious design, as suggested by (17), we narrow our the-
oretical focus to help us identify and understand the effects of
immigration policy. As such, our model architecture pulls from
a wide range of migration theories that refer specifically to the
response of the migrant to immigration obstacles, willingness
to consider unauthorized channels, and migrant learning from
experience and networks (see Table 1).
Table 1. Theory and empirical evidence for modelling choices includ-
ing original data collected for this study (see final column)
Process Literature Modelling Choice Data Source
to Policy
Adapting
(20, 21)
(18, 19)
ability, but not aspiration
decreases perceived
Policy information
Survey data
experiment,
Policy
Strategies
Unauthorized
Considering (4, 5)
increases
aspiration to migrate
between ability and
increases as the gap
unauthorized strategies
Willingness to consider
Survey data
experiments,
List
Learning
(15, 16)
(14, 23)
(9, 22)
ability to migrate
migrate decrease perceived
ability. Past failures to
networks increase perceived
and successful migration of
Successful past migration Survey data
The literature on barriers to movement maintains that ex-
ternal obstacles (such as policy restrictions) generally result in
two outcomes: reduced mobility or undocumented movement.†
Such obstacles reduce people’s perceived ability to migrate
through legal channels, but not necessarily their desire to mi-
grate. This generates a gap between aspiration and perceived
ability (18–21, 24, 25). As this gap widens, individuals become
increasingly likely to migrate through illegal channels (4, 5).
Immigration policies are notoriously complicated and
opaque, and individuals are not likely to be perfectly informed
of policy changes. Individuals navigate the policy environment
through a gradual learning process influenced by their own
experience and communication with their networks (14, 19).
There is a consensus among scholars that migrant decisions
are deeply embedded within social networks (9, 22), and this
paper focuses on the role of networks in spreading information
about migration policies.
†While many policies affect migration (5), our paper refers specifically to restrictions on entry.
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These theories of migrant behavior, the effects of policy
restrictions, and the dynamic nature of learning provide an
overarching theoretical framework from which we develop our
model and corresponding agent rules. However, agent-based
models are often criticized for being constructed based on
an unfalsifiable set of rules and assumptions. We tackle this
critique explicitly by testing our key assumptions empirically
prior to model construction. Theoretically motivated model
processes and associated empirical evidence are summarized
in Table 1 (see also SI Section C.1). For modelling choices we
could not test empirically, we conducted sensitivity analyses,
the results for which can be found in SI Section D. The aim of
the model is to establish the process by which individuals who
are motivated to migrate interact with policy restrictions by
adopting alternative strategies: migrating legally or through
unauthorized means, or, alternatively, choosing to stay home.
In the following sections, we describe each stage of our model,
illustrated by Figure 1, in detail. Additionally, SI Section
A provides a low-level description of model processes and
associated pseudo code.
Fig. 1. System diagram showing agent decisions, feedback processes, and data
types used for calibration
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Initialization. Our ABM consists of an environment, which
represents an origin country, autonomous agents, and condition
action rules that guide agent behaviour (17). Each agent is
allocated a profile of characteristics belonging to an individual
respondent from an original survey conducted in Jamaica.
Modeling always involves some trade-offs. Our survey data
are cross-sectional, and we operate under the assumption that
agents do not change over time and are not replaced if they
migrate.‡ This allows us to maintain the correlation structure
of our data, as realistic demographic profiles are essential in
determining agent eligibility for specific visa channels. Also,
informed by trends in the literature and our survey finding
that over 90% of our sample were committed to a single
destination country, we depict a single corridor. In line with
our model purpose, the destination country is abstract of all
characteristics aside from its policy profile.
Concurrent with extant work (26), social tie formation is
modeled as a function of agent similarity (homophily) and
geographical distance (see SI Section A). We do not make
‡SI Section D.3 presents sensitivity tests where we allow agents to change their preferences as they
age.
assumptions on the types of relationships agents have with
one another. We consider the duration of a migration decision,
from an initial desire to migration attempt, to be one year,
following theoretical evidence (27, 28) and estimates on immi-
grant visa processing times. As agents’ actions are dependent
on those of others, agent variables are updated synchronously
at the end of a procedure (17). This ensures that the only
factor limiting agents’ access to information from agents at
home and abroad is the boundedness imposed by network
structure and not the time at which the agent is called to
act (and how much information it was able to accumulate
up to this point). This design mimics information seeking in
uncertain decision scenarios, of which international migration
is an example (see SI Section A.2.2 for more details on time
and scheduling).
Individual Decisions. To engage in migration, individuals must
both desire and perceive themselves capable of migrating (18–
21).§ In our sample, aspiring migrants are defined as those
surveyed who would like to migrate at least “a little,” and
have considered migrating at least “quite seriously.”¶ As such,
desire to migrate is defined by the intersect of two variables: L,
“like”, and Se, “seriousness” (see Table 2 and SI Section B for
more details on variable scales). As such, absent the desire to
migrate, agents choose to stay home. If they wish to migrate,
individuals choose a channel. Most broadly, there are two
types of migratory channels: legal and unauthorized. We de-
note all strategies or channels as S, where {Sleg, Sunauth} ⊂ S.
Legal channels include the most common visas (SI Section B.3.
and Section E provide further details on unauthorized and
legal migration channels, respectively). The vast majority of
migration literature tends to downplay the wide variation that
exists within unauthorized migration, but case studies show a
wide spectrum of strategies differing in terms of legal costs and
less tangible, normative barriers. We draw on this literature
to distinguish between full noncompliance, or strategies that
circumvent immigration law entirely (e.g. migrating with no
documents or fraudulent documents) and semi-noncompliance
(e.g. strategies where migrants obtain legal documents but
violate migratory restrictions) (29–31).‖ This distinction helps
us to model the legal and normative barriers of unauthorized
migration more accurately.
Agents evaluate their willingness to consider each unautho-
rized strategy separately because it is possible that they will
be willing to consider one, but not the other. Not all migrants
will be willing to consider one or either of these strategies
for normative reasons (32). Individuals are more likely to
consider unauthorized channels as the gap grows between their
desire to migrate, D, and their ability to migrate legally, Aleg
(4, 19). Therefore, the probability that agents will be willing
to consider each unauthorized option, θSunauth , is conditional
on this gap (for empirical test, see SI Section C.1.2.). This
process creates the individual’s strategy choice set.
Each agent has a different perception of their ability to
migrate through a given channel. Agents choose the (legal,
§This model focuses on voluntary migration.
¶We decided to include those who would like to migrate “a little” because the cutpoints between
items in an ordinal scale are often highly subjective and subject to noise. As such, we considered
any response in the affirmative direction of our bipolar scale as a positive statement of aspiration.
Alternatively, we could have defined aspiring migrants as those who would like to migrate at least
a “moderate amount.” This would have reduced the subset by only 45 agents.
‖Salient examples of semi-noncompliance include ‘visa overstaying’ or working on a tourist visa.
See SI Section B.3.1 for a full conceptualization of these strategy types.
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semi-legal or illegal) strategy they will attempt, S∗, through
a weighted random draw, with each strategy weighted by the
agent’s perceived ability to execute it.∗∗ The agent will only
attempt S∗ with a probability P (Attempt) defined by:
P (Attempt) = 1/1 + e(k(T−AS∗ )), [1]
where T is the middle category in our 7-point ability scale
(see SI Section B.2.) and k is the curvature of the logistic
function. For the remainder of this paper we leave k at 1, but
present results for alternative specifications of k in SI Section
D.2. When we compare simulation results to official data
sources, we find that while k affects overall levels of migration,
it does not substantially change its legal composition (see SI
Section C.2.).
An agent’s perceived ability to migrate may or may not
coincide with current policy conditions.†† If an individual
has chosen to attempt a legal strategy (S∗ = Sleg), they will
evaluate their demographics according to the requirements of
the receiving state. Common legal migration routes include
student, low-skilled, high-skilled and family-based visas. An
individual may be prevented from migrating legally simply
because they do not meet the classification criteria for any legal
categories (hereafter, baseline eligibility criteria). For instance,
an individual with no family abroad cannot migrate through
family reunification, regardless of quotas or restrictions. We
define the set of legal migration categories for which a given
migrant is eligible as Vi, where Vi ⊂ Sleg. In addition, a series
of requisites and quotas may be placed on each of the channels
exogenously, thereby excluding otherwise eligible individuals.
We assume agents are indifferent about available legal chan-
nels. That is, if the individual’s optimal migration strategy is
legal migration, they will migrate legally if they are eligible for
at least one visa. If they are eligible for more than one visa,
they may shift across available visa options. These agents can
migrate through alternative legal means if policies change.
For agents whose optimal strategy is an unauthorized one,
the rules are much simpler. The overall probability of success
through each of the two unauthorized strategies is applied
uniformly. Individuals will migrate if they successfully avoid
enforcement. In real life, undocumented migrants may regu-
larize their status in the destination, or legal migrants may
become undocumented after entering legally. As our model
focuses exclusively on migrant entry, the model does not make
assumptions or generalizations about shifts in legal status.
In a simulated year, an individual may attempt only one
strategy S, legal or otherwise, to account for the time necessary
to prepare for migration, possibly through an alternate channel,
in the next year. Agents that have migrated are excluded from
subsequent model processes, but influence the decisions of
their network.
Interaction and Learning. Potential migrants are not immedi-
ately or uniformly aware of immigration policies; they learn
through interaction with immigration authorities and the ex-
periences of others. In our model, agents update their per-
∗∗Note that the strategy set may be reduced if the agent is unwilling to consider one or both of the
unauthorized strategies for normative reasons.
††A 2013-2016 Gallup poll found that 14% of the world’s population wished to migrate (33). However,
international migrants make only 3.3% of the world’s population (34). By discretizing the migrant
decision-making process into various stages – i.e., aspiration to migrate, perceived ability to mi-
grate, and migration attempts, we contribute to the important literature on the ‘aspiration-behavior
gap’ in migration (21, 25, 35).
ceived ability to migrate by aggregating this information.‡‡
Specifically, individuals accumulate information from their net-
work contacts, ηj , and from their own experiences, ηi. These
signals are strategy-specific, and may be positive or nega-
tive. For simplicity, we assume all information sources affect
agents’ perceived ability to migrate through any strategy by
the same magnitude, pi. Tests examining the effects of alterna-
tive weights on positive and negative signals, as well as signals
obtained directly and indirectly are provided in SI Section
D.1. The impact of omitting network effects is also explicitly
examined.
We define C to be the unique effect of the cumulative
information an individual obtains from network contacts, ηj ,
on their ability to migrate through a given strategy. We
assume each additional signal about the policy environment
has a decreasing marginal effect on agents’ perceived ability to
migrate through that strategy. Following established literature
on the learning curve (36, 37), we take the natural log of
the sum of contacts, j ∈ J , who relay an experience with
immigration policy. Agent i computes C separately for positive
(C+) and negative (C−) information at time t. The only
difference is the direction of pi.
Cti,± = ±pi(1 + log
J∑
j=1
ηj) [2]
Individuals also learn from personal experiences with immi-
gration policy. These experiences are necessarily negative, as
a positive experience would entail a successful migration, after
which no learning is necessary. We define B as the unique
effect of an agent’s own experience with immigration policy
on the ability to migrate through a given strategy. Similar to
Equation 2, we consider the effect of one additional migration
failure, f , for agent i, to be marginally decreasing.
Bti = −pi(1 + log
F∑
f=1
ηi,f ) [3]
Finally, each simulated year, agent i updates its ability to
migrate for each strategy S as follows:
Ati,S = At−1i,S + ∆Bi + ∆Ci,+ + ∆Ci,−, [4]
where Ati,S is censored to maintain the range of the original
survey scale. Two main sources of stochasticity affect the learn-
ing process. First, the network connections determining who
the agent is able to learn from, are determined probabilistically
(see SI Section A.1.2). Second, stochasticity is incorporated
into exogenous restrictions on legal and unauthorized channels,
thereby affecting the successes and failures that agents learn
from through personal experience and their networks. This is
detailed later in the paper.
Empirical Calibration and Validation. We calibrate the model
using data from an original survey conducted in Jamaica.§§
‡‡Perceived ability to migrate is dynamic, but aspiration is not. This assumption is based on exper-
imental evidence on the effects of policy information, shown in SI Section C.1.1. Our empirical
analysis shows that varying aspiration as a function of age does affect individuals’ aspiration to mi-
grate. However, sensitivity tests in SI Section D.3 show that programming aspiration as a function
of age does not significantly affect model outcomes.
§§The ethics board of University College London (application number 7045/004) approved all data
collection procedures relating to the survey and experiments. All experiments involving human
subjects were approved by the ethics board of University College London. Informed consent was
obtained by respondents before participation. All data and replication materials can be found at
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/unauthabm.
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This Caribbean island has a historically high propensity for
voluntary migration, and therefore increases the probability
that aspiring migrants will be included in our sample (38).
While there are countries with similarly high rates of aspiring
migrants, Jamaica is a particularly illustrative case because
only a very small proportion of these emigrants qualify as
forced migrants (see SI Section B.1.).¶¶ Although we collect
data from a specific origin country, the behavioral rules devel-
oped and presented in this paper are simple and grounded in
migration theory, and therefore, generalizable to other cases
of voluntary migration.
Our survey was fielded between April and June 2016, and
the sample includes all 14 parishes on the island.∗∗∗ In to-
tal, our sample consists of 1,166 face-to-face interviews with
Jamaican adults from across the island. We designed this
survey to precisely identify the independent components of
the migrant decision and integrate them into a dynamic model
of migration. We measure aspiration and ability to migrate
as distinct indicators and operationalize perceived ability to
migrate as strategy-specific. We also measure support for
unauthorized strategies separately from the perceived ability
to migrate through unauthorized channels. Table 2 shows the
types of data collected and Figure 1 illustrates where they feed
into the model. More information on our survey and specific
items can be found in SI Section B.
There are many reasons why an individual may aspire
to migrate (e.g. perceived earning potential or images of a
foreign country portrayed by the media) or feel able to (e.g.
having sufficient funds). Our model does not seek to identify
individual migration determinants, and we assume our survey
indicators for aspiration and perceived ability capture these
antecedents.
Two important model variables that pose unique measure-
ment challenges are: the influence of policy on migrant decision-
making, and support for unauthorized migration. To estimate
the effects of policy information on perceived ability to migrate,
our survey contained an embedded experiment. Participants
were randomly assigned to view a video about the real difficul-
ties (imposed by policy) Jamaicans may face when attempting
to migrate, or a control condition. Policy effects were esti-
mated by computing between-group differences in participants’
perceptions of their ability to migrate (see SI Section B.4 for
experimental protocol and SI Section D.1 for alternative model
specifications).
Standard survey questions on unauthorized migration are
impeded by social desirability bias. Consequently, we use a
between-subjects list experiment to estimate support for each
strategy (39). This design protects respondents’ anonymity
on sensitive items. Here, respondents receive a list of possible
migration strategies and are instructed to reveal only the num-
ber of strategies they would support, but not which ones. The
treatment list includes an unauthorized migration strategy
and the control list does not. A simple difference in means
provides an estimate of support for the unauthorized strategy
(see SI Section B.3.2). We include two independently random-
ized list experiments to measure support for both classes of
unauthorized strategies (illegal and semi-legal).
To demonstrate that our model generates meaningful pat-
terns of migration, we use a two-stage strategy to test model
¶¶We expect that individuals who are being forced from their homes are likely to make migration
decisions under heightened constraints compared to other aspiring migrants.
∗∗∗Jamaica is geographically subdivided into 14 large administrative units, called parishes.
Table 2. Data collected or used to calibrate the model
Type Variable/Estimate Values Source
across
Vary
Variables
Individual
D = L ∩ Se
Desire to migrate,
1 ≤ Se ≤ 4
1 ≤ L ≤ 7 Survey item
agents
S = {Legal
a strategy, AS
Ability to execute 1 ≤ AS ≤ 7
updated
endogenously
Survey item,
illegal}
Semi-legal,
Family}
Sector, Income,
d = {Education,
demographics, αd
Visa eligibility
0 ≤ αf ≤ 20
0 ≤ αi ≤ 2, 130
αs = {0, 1}
1 ≤ αe ≤ 8 Survey items
Fixed
Effects
Aggregate
pi
(positive/ negative),
policy information
Effect of receiving pi = ±0.550
experiment
Policy
ability on θSill
aspiration and
Effect of gap in
βsemi = 0.035
βillegal = 0.051
experiment
List
setting
model
Varies by
Policy
border detection, r
Prob. avoiding
Figs. 3-5: r = 0.30
0 ≤ r ≤ 1 Survey item
migration, p
semi-legal
Prob. successful
Figs. 3-5: p = 0.32
0 ≤ p ≤ 1
Survey item
US State Dept.,
Family}
Low-Skilled,
Student,
{High Skilled,
Visa quotas, vq
0 ≤ vq ≤ 1
Survey items
DHS Yearbook,
See SI Section B for more details on data (including experiments) and
descriptive statistics. This table shows policy settings for the validation
model. Details on policy values for in-silico experiments can be found in
Table 3 and in SI Section E. Income is in US$. p is a product of visitor
visa acceptance rates and internal enforcement. See SI Section B.2. for
details.
quality. First, we assess the model’s condition action rules
through empirical tests of intermediate processes (e.g. do
agents adjust their ability to migrate when receiving a policy
signal?). These tests are listed in Table 1, and SI Section C.1.
contains the details and results of these tests.††† Second, we
validate model outcomes, testing for agreement with empirical
data from official sources. We find that our model approxi-
mates real migrant volume, composition with regard to legal
status, and migrant learning (SI Section C.2.). For these tests,
we set our model’s policy conditions to match those of the
United States for a fixed set of years. In our comparisons of
migrant volume and composition, we use independent data
from the Jamaican census and the US Census Bureau. In our
comparison of migrant learning, we employ survey data not
†††SI Section D reports additional sensitivity tests.
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used in model calibration.
Experimenting with Policies
ABMs allow us to isolate components of a policy package and
test their interactions, enabling controlled experiments that
would be impossible in real life. Our experiments examine
restrictions on students, high-skilled and low-skilled workers,
as well as individuals who migrate to join family members
abroad. Additionally, we examine a policy of free movement
and a scenario where all the channels mentioned are restricted.
Please see SI Section E for further references on the details
below.
Early Departures for International Students. Student migra-
tion has become politically problematic in many countries.
To reduce student migration, many governments restrict the
opportunities available to them after graduation. For example,
one of the 2015 UK General Election commitments was a net
reduction in migration to under 100,000, and in 2014, students
made up the largest share of the non-EU migrant population.
The UK closed its post-study work route to new applications
from non-EU students in April 2012. In our model, agents
who intend to work or save money while abroad will no longer
be able to migrate if this option is restricted.
Closing Doors to High-Skilled Workers. Many politicians sug-
gest that high-skilled jobs should prioritize native workers over
foreigners. During his campaign, Donald Trump said, “I will
end forever the use of the H1-B as a cheap labor program, and
institute an absolute requirement to hire American workers
first ... No exceptions” (40). In the UK, a recent proposal
from the immigration minister would introduce a £1,000 levy
on employers for each EU skilled worker recruited after Brexit.
Because these penalties are imposed on the employer rather
than the potential migrant, we operationalize high-skilled work
restrictions as a quota applied uniformly to all agents who
meet eligibility conditions for that channel.
Caps on Low-Skilled Workers. Many countries implement quo-
tas or caps on the number of low-skilled migrants admitted.
Often, these are sector-specific, and employers only recruit
for sectors with the greatest domestic need. After the UK
voted to leave the EU, the immigration minister was quick to
propose sector and country caps to regulate and bring down
low-skilled migration. Consequently, we use quotas to restrict
eligible agents in our in-silico experiments.
Thresholds for Family Reunification. Through family reunifi-
cation visas, migrants may apply to have their family members
join them in the destination country. After Donald Trump was
elected, Republican senators proposed strict limits on these
visas, hoping that migrants would reorient towards employ-
ment channels. This proposal included limiting sponsorship to
spouses and young children, while imposing requirements for
background checks and proof of financial support. The family
reunification channel is often restricted through requirements
placed on the resident migrant. In the US, for example, the
sponsor must demonstrate that they can financially support
their family and the incoming arrival at an annual income
125% above the poverty line. A similar threshold applies
in the UK. Income information about family abroad is not
necessarily observable for individuals at the origin country.
However, the length of their absence is observable and is also
a well-established indicator of migrant earnings (e.g. 41).‡‡‡
Free Movement. In theory, free movement of people represents
the absence of migratory channels. Individuals who desire
to move abroad would be able to do so without government-
imposed restrictions. Free movement of people is one of the
main pillars of the European Union. All EU citizens can reside
in any country within the Union for up to three months, and
may stay for longer if they fulfill basic conditions. To shift
from a policy of free movement to one with restrictions, a
government would likely define and impose migrant channels.
The United Kingdom, upon leaving the EU, will find itself in
this position.
Table 3. Agent eligibility and thresholds for visa categories
Category
Visa
Conditions
Eligibility
Baseline
Eligible
Percent
Restrictions
Additional
Student
household income
90th percentile
Secondary school, 16%
abroad
earn or save money
who do not intend to
Accept only those
Work
High-Skilled University degree 10%
(randomly selected)
visa at the baseline
(quota) eligible for this
Accept a fixed %
Work
Low-Skilled
transportation
construction, or
agriculture,
Experience in 18%
(randomly selected)
visa at the baseline
(quota) eligible for this
Accept a fixed %
Reunification
Family
living abroad
family member
At least one 58%
for a fixed set of years
member living abroad
who have a family
Accept only those
Closed None 1.7% Aggregation of above
Free Movement None 100% Accept all
The student channel cannot be entirely closed, as individuals can still
migrate as students if they do not intend to earn or save money abroad.
This accounts for the small percentage of agents who can migrate in the
closed setting.
Results
In our first set of experiments (Figs. 2-4), we compare mi-
gration patterns to a baseline setting. Our baseline setting
classifies agents into common migrant channels absent of quo-
tas and requirements, which can additionally be imposed by
the host government. Classifying potential migrants into these
channels has its own effect – limiting migration among individ-
uals who are not eligible (see Table 3). Thus, by comparing
each policy setting to the baseline, we isolate the unique
marginal impact of quotas and restrictions among eligible mi-
grants. In Figure 2, we fully restrict one channel at a time.
We then focus on the two visa routes that produced the most
‡‡‡There is considerable variation in earnings trajectories across migrant groups. West Indian men
are significantly disadvantaged when it comes to earnings relative to foreign whites (42).
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substantial reorientation in these experiments, to observe the
effects of more gradual increases in these policy restrictions.
In Figures 2- 4, we maintain a constant level of enforcement
for unauthorized channels (see SI Section B.2 on calibration
of this value). Therefore, we conclude with experiments that
vary levels of enforcement for all immigration policy settings
We report the results at the end of 20 simulated years,
as agent learning about entry policies consistently stabilizes
around that time (see SI, Section F.) For each simulation
run, we compute the migrant stock accumulated across all
simulated years. All our figures present the mean across 1000
runs.
Each bar in Figure 2 shows changes (as a percentage of
aspiring migrants) from the baseline conditions in terms of
legal migration (blue), unauthorized migration (red) and non-
migration (black).§§§ In the baseline setting, agents may
migrate if they are eligible for any of the four visa channels
(see Table 3). In this condition, approximately 44% of aspiring
migrants migrate through legal channels, 18% migrate through
unauthorized channels, and 39% do not migrate. This shows
that the mere existence of migratory categories excludes many
would-be migrants.
Fig. 2. Mean effects of policy restrictions on migration outcomes relative to the
baseline setting (where x=0)
Free
Movement
Closed
Family
Low−Skilled
High−Skilled
Student
Unauthorized Non Migrants Legal
−60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60
Baseline
% of Aspiring Migrants
As is shown in the top two bars of Figure 2, full restrictions
on students or high-skilled workers lead to negligible changes
in migration outcomes. Figure 2 indicates that full restric-
tions on student visas lead to 0.64% fewer aspiring migrants
entering legally, and a corresponding 0.51% and 0.13% more
aspiring migrants opting not to migrate and migrating through
unauthorized channels, respectively, compared to the baseline
eligibility model. Closing off the high-skilled work channel
leads to a very small percentage of aspiring migrants opting for
the unauthorized route (0.54%), and a similarly small, 1.54%,
increase in non-migration. These findings are rooted in the
fact that individuals in many developing countries, like Ja-
maica, are often not eligible for these channels even in baseline
conditions. Hence, additional quotas or restrictions on these
channels will have little to no effect on migration.
Next, we examine full restrictions on low-skilled visas and
family-based visas. In Figure 2, we see that closing off the
low-skilled route would lead to 10.64% fewer aspiring migrants
§§§Unauthorized migration includes illegal and semi-legal categories.
entering legally than would have done in baseline conditions.
Instead, 2.50%, or approximately one quarter of these individ-
uals, will opt for unauthorized migration, with the remainder
not migrating. Compared to migration levels in the baseline
setting, closing off the low-skilled channel leads to a 13.73%
growth in unauthorized migration and a 21.23% growth in
non-migration.
When the family route is closed, 16.82% fewer agents enter
legally, as a percentage of aspiring migrants. This shift corre-
sponds with a 12.46% decrease in migration among aspiring
migrants and a 4.36% increase in unauthorized migration. In
other words, approximately 26% of the individuals prevented
from migrating legally as the family reunification channel is
closed, reorient to unauthorized channels. Compared to mi-
gration levels at the baseline, closing the family route results
in a 32.35% growth in non-migration and a 24.25% growth in
unauthorized migration levels. Unauthorized migration in this
setting grows at more than double the rate of the low-skilled
setting.
Reorientation to unauthorized channels is so high when
family reunification channels are restricted because the family-
based channel is most easily accessible at the baseline level,
as Jamaica’s vast diaspora is helpful in continuing migrant
flows. This is often the case for countries with a long history
of migration. Eligibility for low-skilled work permits generally
require prior work experience in a high-demand sector, making
this channel less accessible than the family route.
Finally, we consider two opposing scenarios: one in which
all legal channels are fully restricted (the Closed scenario)
and one in which we remove migratory channels completely
(Free Movement). In Figure 2, we see that, relative to the
baseline setting, closing all channels would increase unautho-
rized migration by 9.76% and non-migration by 27.04%. As a
percentage of all aspiring migrants, the Free Movement setting
decreases unauthorized migration by 12.27% and increases
legal migration by 49.64%. If a country removed immigration
channels in favor of free movement, total migration would
increase substantially, but unauthorized migration would also
decrease substantially. It is noteworthy that the removal of
migratory channels has the largest influence on migration of
all of the policy settings examined. In effect, minimal baseline
eligibility conditions are so restrictive that removing them
changes the volume and composition of migration far more
than even the most draconian policy restrictions, as shown in
a comparison of the Closed and Free Movement settings.
In the figures above, we examined the effects of fully restrict-
ing visa routes. Out of all visa channels considered, low-skilled
and family restrictions produced the most substantial reori-
entation towards unauthorized channels. In Figure 3 and 4
we examine the relationship between policy restriction and
reorientation by looking at gradual increases in low-skilled and
family restrictions. Both figures present the migrant stock
accumulated across all 20 simulated years, averaged across
1000 runs. The error bands in each figure represent the 2.75
and 97.5 percentiles for each level of restriction.
Low-skilled visa restrictions are operationalized as quotas or
the probability of failing to receive a visa. In practice, an agent
eligible at the baseline draws a number from a random uniform
distribution. If this number is larger than, for example, 0.1
(10% quota), the agent is not granted a visa. This amounts to
approximately 90% of agents not being able to get a low-skilled
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Fig. 3. Mean effects of restricting low-skilled work visas on migration outcomes
relative to the baseline with 2.75 and 97.5 percentile error band, ratio of unauthorized
to legal migration, and rug indicating Pr(Failure) settings where unauthorized migration
is not significantly different from unauthorized migration in the baseline setting.
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work visa in this example.
Figure 3 gradually increases the probability of failing to
secure a low-skilled work visa, compared to the baseline, at
intervals of 0.1. This, in effect, estimates the impact of low-
skilled work quotas among eligible agents. As we increase the
low-skilled visa quota, the percentage of aspiring migrants mi-
grating legally declines at what appears to be a much steeper
rate than unauthorized migration. A closer examination shows
that for the most part, we see relatively stable levels of unau-
thorized migration as a proportion of would-be legal migration
– approximately one-third. However, as the quota becomes
highly restrictive (Pr(Failure) = 0.7), we begin to see the
ratio of unauthorized to would-be legal migration decrease
to less than one-quarter (2.34% / 10.58%). In other words,
highly restrictive quotas (Pr(Failure) ≥ 0.7) on low-skilled
work decrease legal migration at a much greater rate than
they increase unauthorized migration.
We also run a one-sided Mann-Whitney test for each setting
of Pr(Failure) considering an alpha value of 0.05 to examine
whether average unauthorized migration is statistically differ-
ent from the baseline. We find significant differences at all
levels of Pr(Failure) larger than 0.2. In Figure 3, insignificant
differences are indicated with the presence of a rug line above
the x-axis tick.¶¶¶ We do not report the Mann-Whitney tests
on legal migration, as legal migration is significantly different
from the baseline at every level of Pr(Failure).
As mentioned above, governments often restrict family mi-
gration by placing income requirements on sponsors. Although
we cannot vary income requirements, ‘years since migration’
(YSM ) is a strong predictor of migrant income. Upon arrival,
migrants generally earn less than native born citizens, but
incomes rise rapidly with labor market experience. Studies of
¶¶¶Although legal and unauthorized migration means across runs are distinct, the error bands span-
ning the 2.75 and 97.5 percentiles show a large overlap. Significantly higher levels of unauthorized
migration at all intervals of Pr(Failure)≥ 0.2 are confirmed by one-sided Mann-Whitney test.
immigrant labor market adjustment have shown that immi-
grant incomes tend to equal or surpass native counterparts
after a period of 10-15 years (41, 43). As such, we can ap-
proximate a wage level with which each YSM requirement
corresponds. We use US wages, as this is the primary des-
tination for Jamaicans, but we should expect trends to be
generalizable to other destinations too (e.g. 43).
Figure 4 shows the effect of restricting the YSM require-
ment for potential family sponsors compared to the baseline.
In order to migrate through this channel, an individual must
have at least one family member who has lived abroad for
a number of years larger than or equal to the YSM require-
ment, as captured by our survey data (at the baseline, the
YSM requirement ≥ 0). The top x-axis represents the wage
accumulated in 2015 among American Community Survey
respondents born in Jamaica living in the US for the corre-
sponding number of years (44). These data show wages rising
consistently before reaching a peak at YSM ≥ 48.17
Fig. 4. Mean effects of restricting family reunification channels on migration out-
comes relative to the baseline with 2.75 and 97.5 percentile error band and ratio of
unauthorized to legal migration
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Restricting family sponsorship requirements from 2 to 18
years – which corresponds to estimated wage levels between
US$23,000 to US$38,000 – appears to have the largest effect
in reducing legal and driving up unauthorized migration, com-
pared to baseline conditions. This trend becomes relatively
flat with sponsorship thresholds corresponding to yearly wages
higher than US$38,000. At a two-year YSM requirement (cor-
responding to an earnings threshold of ≈ US$23,000), legal
migration as a percentage of aspiring migrants is 3.08% lower
compared to the baseline. This corresponds with a 0.75% reori-
entation of aspiring migrants towards unauthorized channels.
At a 10-year restriction (≈ US$31,000), almost 3% of aspir-
ing migrants have reoriented towards unauthorized channels.
At an 18-year restriction (≈ US$38,000), 14.8% of aspiring
17Wage values displayed in Figure 4 are estimated using local polynomial regression (see SI Section
E).
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migrants who would have entered legally under baseline con-
ditions are no longer doing so. Approximately 28% of these
individuals are now adopting unauthorized channels. After
this point, further restrictions have only subtle effects on the
composition of migrants. Across the full range of settings,
relative to the baseline, the ratio of unauthorized to legal
migration oscillates around 0.26, increasing marginally from
the lowest setting to larger values (see also Fig. 2). We run a
one-sided Mann-Whitney test comparing each setting of YSM
to baseline conditions and find levels of unauthorized migra-
tion in all settings are significantly greater than the baseline.
Legal migration is significantly different from the baseline at
every level of YSM.
The experiments shown above vary policy settings for legal
channels but employ a constant level of enforcement. However,
some might argue that the threat of unauthorized migration
could be reduced by enforcing border controls or increasing
apprehension rates. Figure 5 shows that this may not be very
efficient. In this experiment, we varied the rate of apprehension
for both unauthorized strategies jointly from 10% to 90% and
show the percentage of aspiring migrants who migrate through
unauthorized means for each policy setting presented in Figure
2, except for the Free Movement setting.18 Unlike Figure 2,
these results are not subtracted from the baseline.
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Fig. 5. Mean effect of increasing levels of enforcement on unauthorized migration
For all policy settings, the percentage of aspiring migrants
entering through unauthorized channels (including full non-
compliance and semi-noncompliance) remains quite high even
at the very highest levels of enforcement. For instance, when
authorities are able to capture seven out of ten unauthorized
migrants, we see approximately 27.71%, 22.30% and 20.43%
of aspiring migrants migrating through unauthorized channels
for the Closed, Family and Low-Skilled settings respectively.
At lower levels of apprehension, for example Probability of Ap-
prehension = 0.5, more than a quarter of all aspiring migrants
use unauthorized channels for all policy settings. When all
legal channels are fully restricted (the Closed setting), 42.52%
of all aspiring migrants enter the destination country through
unauthorized channels.
The effectiveness of apprehension is non-linear. In the base-
line setting, increasing the rate of enforcement from Probability
of Apprehension = 0.1 to 0.5 decreases unauthorized migration
18We do not include the Free Movement setting because it is impossible to migrate through unautho-
rized channels in a setting where, strictly speaking, they can cross the border freely.
by 14.63%, but increasing the rate of enforcement from Prob-
ability of Apprehension = 0.5 to 0.9 decreases unauthorized
migration by 20.76%. In the Closed setting, unauthorized
migration decreases by 22.68% when apprehension increases
from 0.1 to 0.5, but decreases by 32.52% when apprehension
increases from 0.5 to 0.9. The greatest gains can be made
when governments capture more than six in ten unauthorized
migrants, an ambitious figure when one considers the volume
of unauthorized migration and the diverse forms it can take.
Figure 5 also shows that if enforcement of unauthorized
migration is 80-90%, levels of unauthorized migration tend to
converge across all policy settings. That is, strictly speaking,
when levels of enforcement are sufficiently high, the visa policy
restrictions have little effect on the rate of unauthorized mi-
gration. This suggests that more than 80% of all unauthorized
migrants would have to be apprehended to account for the
increased reorientation of stringent policy restrictions.
Discussion
We build a theoretically-informed and data-driven agent-based
model of migration that simulates the effects of immigration
policies, allowing us to observe the reorientation of flows to-
wards unauthorized channels when legal channels are restricted.
We find that government-imposed restrictions on migrants can
decrease total migration. However, some restrictions are highly
ineffective and others only decrease legal migration at the cost
of changing the balance of legal and unauthorized migrants.
The impact of immigration policy depends on the specific
restriction imposed. Policies that prevent students or high-
skilled workers from migrating legally have little effect because
eligible individuals are likely able to migrate through alterna-
tive legal categories. Meanwhile, restrictions on family-based
visas produce the largest reductions in total migration and, si-
multaneously, the greatest reorientation towards unauthorized
channels. Restricting low-skilled work reduces total migration
to a lesser extent than family-reunification restrictions, but
the rate of reorientation to unauthorized channels is also much
lower. We also find that, relative to a system of free movement,
the minimal eligibility conditions required to impose migratory
channels are highly restrictive on their own.
We find that unauthorized migration remains quite high
even at the highest rates of apprehension. This relationship
is nonlinear; the most substantial reductions in unauthorized
migration occur at very high rates of enforcement. These
findings are consistent with recent empirical literature, which
has found increases in border enforcement in the US to be
highly ineffective at reducing unauthorized migration (45).
This model represents a first and important step in using
data-driven agent based models to observe ‘substitution ef-
fects,’ whereby potential migrants, who would have migrated
legally, migrate through unauthorized means due to changes in
policy. In the current context where measures and predictions
of migration, particularly unauthorized migration, are based
on highly imperfect data and estimation techniques, we believe
that our approach could be used to answer questions that have
heretofore eluded empirical investigation.
Our findings suggest a number of avenues for future research.
First, we look to calibrate the model using data from new
contexts. Results will likely vary across countries with different
migration histories and diaspora abroad, or across countries
individuals have greater access to legal channels or where fewer
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individuals aspire to move abroad. We could consider the case
of Mexico, for example. Mexican citizens tend to have much
lower intentions to live or work abroad than Jamaicans (46),
but are also generally wealthier (GDP per capita is almost
double that of Jamaica)(47), and therefore will likely have
a relatively higher ability to migrate legally. At the same
time, the well-established tradition of coyotaje, or the hiring of
smugglers, may also make unauthorized migration from Mexico
easier and more accessible (48). Likewise, we could examine
Indian migrants, who represented the highest proportion of
high-skilled visas and the second highest proportion of student
visas to the US in 2016 (49). These circumstances are notably
distinct from those of Jamaican migrants, for whom high-
skilled and students visas are largely inaccessible.
Additionally, the model could explore the conditions under
which individuals may adapt by changing destination countries,
instead of changing channels (5). This is a potentially impor-
tant and relatively understudied behavioral response to policy
change. Also, subsequent models may expand their scope
beyond migrant entry, allowing for undocumented migrants to
regularize their status in the destination, or for legal migrants
to become undocumented after entering legally. These models
will also look to incorporate return migration, as reverse flows
are also affected by government policy. Several studies on
the Mexico-U.S. corridor have shown that increased border
enforcement has turned temporary migrations into permanent
ones as migrants will often stay abroad if they fear facing
another risky crossing in the future (45).
We also look to examine the endogeneity of immigration
policies. While this paper examines how migration flows
respond to immigration policies, policies also respond to mi-
gration flows. In 2015, for example, Lebanon established
restrictive border policies to stem the flow of Syrian refugees
into the country (50). Intertemporal policy adjustment can
counteract fluctuations in migration levels. As such, endo-
geneizing policy in the simulation could reveal a pattern of
cyclical returns to equilibrium, in terms of volume and legal
composition. A further question that future ABM research
might seek to address is whether policy effects are asymmetric
(51). For example, is the magnitude of effect observed when
transitioning from a more restrictive-policy scenario (A) to a
more liberal-policy scenario (B) equivalent to the transition
from scenario B to A, or does the size of the effect depend
on the direction of the change? Finally, given the importance
of network interactions for driving migrant adaptation (SI
Section D.1), we encourage future scholars to use agent-based
models to examine additional functions of migrant networks.
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